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Por fin El Nuevo Día reporta los efectos de la crísis inmobiliaria en Puerto Rico. Era imposible pretender que la situación de los bienes raíces en la Isla era un asunto estrictamente local, debido a la llamada recesión criolla. Aquí donde todo el sistema bancario/hipotecario está atado al estadounidense era demasiado esperar no afectarnos por la crísis inmobiliaria americana. El artículo apunta someramente las causas y los efectos de la situación americana en Puerto Rico.

Hoy sabemos que la afluencia habida con anterioridad a la crísis fue más bien una ampliación del crédito a sectores que antes no eran elegibles para tomar prestado. Es decir, los parámetros para prestar dinero se hicieron mucho más flexibles tanto para el solicitante como para el propósito que lo solicitaba. De tal modo se pudo prestar a quienes antes no cualificaban para lo que antes no se prestaba. Con tanto dinero disponible en manos del consumidor y con el acceso a todo lo que deseaba se produjo una sensación de afluencia ilimitada. Ya en el 2004 se detallaba este escenario en Studien-von-zeitfragen.

Since 1997, the total of home mortgage debt for Americans has risen 94% to a colossal $7.4 trillion, a debt of some $120,000 for a family of four. Bank loans for real estate purchases have risen since 1997 by 200%, to $2.4 trillion. Average US home prices have risen by 50% in the period since 1998. In 2003 alone a record total of $1 trillion in new mortgage loans were made. In 1997 mortgages totalled $202 billion.

In many parts of the US, home price inflation has become alarming. An apartment in Manhattan is now above $1 million. Home prices in Boston have risen by 64% in five years. California real estate prices are soaring. On average US home prices have risen 50% in six years, an unprecedented rise, driven by Greenspan‘s easy credit. In seven years to 2004, prices of US homes had risen on paper by $7 trillion to a total of $15 trillion, the highest in US history…

The rise in home prices has been driven by cheap interest rates and banks rushing to lend with abandon. Because two semi-government agencies, the Federal National Mortgage Association, known as FannieMae, and the Government National Mortgage Association, or GinnieMae buy up the bank‘s mortgage contracts, taking the risk from the local banks, so the local lending bank has less pressure to guarantee that he lends to low-risk credit-worthy families likely to repay the loan.

The US Congress has passed new laws making it even easier for families to buy homes with no penny of their own money required initially as „down payment.“ This has meant a huge rise in mortgage loans to economically marginal or risky families. The number of such risky or „sub-prime“ mortgage loans has risen by 70% this year alone, and now makes up 18% of all US mortgages. Many of these risky mortgages are made under „adjustable rate mortgages“. Today adjustable rates are low, just above 4%. Because of this some 35% of all new mortgages are adjustable today.

So long as rates stay low, the roulette wheel of debt rolls on. The problem begins when interest rates rise and families, lured into buying a home with variable interest rate payments, suddenly find their monthly cost of paying the mortgage has exploded as interest rates rise. At that point, US banks will face a serious bad loan problem, far worse than that of 1990-92 when several of the largest US banks were on the brink of failure. US rates began to rise significantly in May, and the Fed was forced to raise its official rate on June 30 for the first time in four years. Many banks have loans written in adjustable mortgage rates. As US interest rates continue to rise over the next twelve months or so, that will trigger a wave of mortgage defaults. Some industry experts fear a „bloodbath“ in 2005.

The American family is highly indebted, not just for their home. The Federal Reserve data show a total US debt level now above $35 trillions, or some $ 450,000 for a typical family of four. Average consumer debt for credit cards, autos and such is at record highs. Carmakers continue to offer car loans, with loans for up to six or even seven years. Many Americans owe more on their car than it is worth. The debt grows. As long as Fed rates are at 43 year lows, the debt is manageable. When US rates rise, it becomes unmanageable for many. The rise has begun…

Hasta que la burbuja explotó. Los intereses subieron para compensar por la inflación. Los instrumentos negociables en el mercado tenían que permanecer competitivos y la única manera de lograrlo era desacelerar el incremento el los precios de venta y proveerles una mayor ganancia a los inversionistas, aumentando los intereses. Sobre ésto puedes leer mi artículo ¿Quien fija el interés de tu hipoteca? Para detener la ebullición inmobiliaria no bastó con subir levemente las tasas de interés. No, hubo que subirlas del 5.53 (7-1-2005) al 6.80 (7-21-2006) en un año. Las consecuencias fueron nefastas y se sintieron mundialmente ( Inventario inmbiliario mundial )

Lo acreedores con préstamos de interés ajustable vieron sus pagos mensuales elevarse dramáticamente. Muchos ya no podían pagar sus hipotecas, se incrementó la delincuencia en los pagos y posteriormente comenzaron las ejecuciones. Ante este escenario los bancos hicieron más estrictos sus requisitos para otorgar préstamos pero ya era tarde. Tenían en cartera miles de hipotecas de alto riesgo. De tal modo hoy nos encontramos ante este posible escenario presentado en Calculated Risk:

[M]y most recent estimates have been that credit losses on mortgages could be as high as $1 trillion and total credit losses for the financial system could be as high as $1.7 including all the other losses (commercial real estate loans, credit cards, auto loans, student loans, leveraged loans, industrial and commercial loans, corporate bonds, muni bonds, losses on credit default swaps). How many of these losses are borne by banks (I meant both commercial and investment banks in my use of the term “banks”) depends on the allocation of theseimpaired assets among banks and non-banks.

The argument for a trillion dollar of losses on mortgages alone is based on the following three parameters (two of which an undisputed while a third is more subject to uncertainty. First, let’s conservatively assume that home prices fall about 20% rather than 30% so that only 16 million households are underwater; this assumption is not very controversial as most now would agree that a cumulative fall in home prices of 20% is a floor, not a ceiling to such price deflation. Second, lets assume – as Goldman Sachs does – that a foreclosed unit causes a loss of 50 cents on a dollar of mortgage for the lender as, in addition to the fall in the home price one has to add the large legal and other foreclosure costs including loss of rent on empty properties, risk of the property being vandalized and cost of maintaining an empty property before resale. Third, lets assume – and this is more controversial – that 50% percent of households who are underwater eventually walk away or are foreclosed. Then, since the average US mortgage is $250k total losses from borrowers walking away from their homes are $1 trillion. Goldman Sachs agrees with me on two parameters (20% fall in home prices and 50% loss on a mortgages) but more conservatively assumes that only 20-25% of underwater home owners will walk away. In this case mortgage losses would be “only” $500 billion. But home prices may likely fall more than
20% and with a 30% fall in home prices 21 million households (40% of the 51 million with a mortgage) would be underwater. So, there is certainly uncertainty on how many underwater households will walk away but given the recent evidence of subprime but also near prime and prime borrowers walking away even before they are foreclosed one can be pessimistic on this.

En Puerto Rico la falta de acceso a crédito a ocasionado un inventario creciente de propiedades en venta, una acelerada baja en la cantidad de prospectos compradores cualificados y finalmente un reajuste en la valoración de las propiedades.

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